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Ethical challenges experienced by UK
military medical personnel deployed to
Sierra Leone (operation GRITROCK) during
the 2014–2015 Ebola outbreak: a
qualitative study
Heather Draper* and Simon Jenkins
Abstract
Background: As part of its response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west Africa, the United Kingdom (UK)
government established an Ebola treatment unit in Sierra Leone, staffed by military personnel. Little is known about
the ethical challenges experienced by military medical staff on humanitarian deployment. We designed a qualitative
study to explore this further with those who worked in the treatment unit.
Method: Semi-structured, face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted with 20 UK military personnel
deployed between October 2014 and April 2015 in one of three roles in the Ebola treatment unit: clinician; nursing
and nursing assistant; and other medical support work, including infection control and laboratory and mortuary
services.
Results: Many participants reported feeling ethically motivated to volunteer for deployment, but for some personal
interests were also a consideration. A small minority had negative feelings towards the deployment, others felt that
this deployment like any other was part of military service. Almost all had initial concerns about personal safety but
were reassured by their pre-deployment 'drills and skills', and personal protective equipment. Risk perceptions were
related to perceptions about military service. Efforts to minimise infection risk were perceived to have made good
patient care more difficult. Significantly, some thought the humanitarian nature of the mission justified tolerating
greater risks to staff. Trust in the military institution and colleagues was expressed; many participants referred to the
ethical obligation within the chain of command to protect those under their command. Participants expected
resources to be overwhelmed and ‘empty beds’ presented a significant and pervasive ethical challenge. Most
thought more patients could and should have been treated. Points of reference for participants’ ethical values were:
previous deployment experience; previous UK/National Health Service experience; professional ethics; and, distinctly
military values (that might not be shared with non-military workers).
Conclusion: We report the first systematic exploration of the ethical challenges face by a Western medical military
in the international response to the first major Ebola outbreak. We offer unique insights into the military healthcare
workers’ experiences of humanitarian deployment. Many participants expressed motivations that gave them
common purpose with civilian volunteers.
Keywords: Ebola virus disease, Military medical ethics, Ethics, Disaster ethics, Infectious disease outbreaks, Military
humanitarian interventions, Qualitative research, Empirical ethics, Medical rules of eligibility
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Background
In July 2014, the World Health Organisation (WHO) ac-
knowledged the seriousness of the Ebola virus disease
(EVD) outbreak in West Africa, and called on govern-
ments around the world to respond with humanitarian
aid and to take action to contain the spread [1]. The
United Kingdom (UK) government, through the Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID), and work-
ing with Save the Children, deployed its military
(Operation GRITROCK) to Sierra Leone in a variety of
roles, one of which was to staff a small, well equipped
Ebola treatment unit for international and local health-
care workers (and other EVD-infected foreign nationals),
[2] co-located with a larger Ebola unit for the general
population that would be staffed by a non-governmental
organisation (NGO). Two parallel military medical infra-
structures were deployed: one to provide general health
services for military personnel (and other eligible per-
sons) and the other specifically and only to treat EVD
cases in the treatment unit. According to Bricknell et al.,
[3] the goal for the Ebola treatment unit was “to demon-
strably deliver a level of care to infected healthcare
workers and other entitled patients as close as safely
practicable to that provided in Western national infec-
tious disease containment facilities.” The Medical Rules
of Eligibility (MRoE),1 “covered the international com-
munity deployed in support of the wider Ebola crisis,
which included those facilities contracted by DFID and
other international healthcare workers employed in
ETCs [Ebola Treatment Centres]” and also gave the most
senior Commander Medical “the discretion to accept ad-
missions for Sierra Leonean healthcare workers” capacity
permitting [3].
The original plan was for a single deployment to the
treatment unit lasting 60 days. In the event, several dif-
ferent tranches were deployed between October 2014
and July 2015 [3].
Very little literature exists exploring the ethical chal-
lenges experienced by humanitarian workers [4–6] and
even less is known about the experiences of the medical
military employed in an humanitarian capacity, though
there is an established body of literature on military med-
ical ethics in combat and peacekeeping scenarios [7, 8].
Draper (HD), a civilian Professor of Bioethics, had been
collaborating in various ways over for several years with
the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (Academia and
Research) (RCDM) to improve understanding of, and
training in, military medical ethics. After the withdrawal
of British troops from Afghanistan, there were plans in
place to design ethics training for potential humanitarian
deployment as the UK military moved into contingency
following the withdrawal. When the UK Ebola response
was announced, it was recognised that this would be a
unique opportunity to gain an understanding of the
ethical challenges faced by a humanitarian military deploy-
ment. Accordingly, a joint application for funding was
made to the Economic and Social Research Council and
unprecedented access to participants for this study was fa-
cilitated by RCDM. It was also recognised that whilst the
Ebola outbreak was an extreme scenario it had elements
in common with other mass infectious disease outbreaks
and other events (e.g. chemical or radiological contamin-
ation) where responding posed significant risks to medical
personnel.
Methods
The key objectives for this qualitative study were to
identify and explore the ethical challenges the military
personnel working in the Ebola treatment unit felt they
had faced, and to understand how they responded to
these with a view to improving preparation and training
for future humanitarian deployments.
Participants were recruited by email between March
and July 2015. Sampling was purposive to cover role-
group and timing of deployment. Potential participants
were identified (by a RCDM post-doctoral military nurse
researcher with expertise in qualitative methods) by de-
ployed role within three broad groups: clinical/doctor;
nurse/nursing assistant; and medical support, including
laboratory, infection control, personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) monitors, and mortuary attendants etc. This
enabled us to capture a wide range of experiences across
medical and military hierarchies. All personnel deployed
to the treatment unit, and having returned from deploy-
ment during the recruitment period, were included. The
email, sent by the same military member of staff, con-
tained an invitation letter from HD (the principal inves-
tigator), the participant information sheet and sample
consent form. Recipients were asked to respond directly
to HD if they were interested in participating. All partic-
ipants were offered a face-to-face interview but some
preferred to be interviewed by telephone. Consent was
obtained and recorded immediately prior to the inter-
view. No military record of those participating was kept
(nor were the identities of any of those participating
shared with military colleagues) and a reminder was
therefore sent to all after two weeks, by the same mili-
tary member of staff. The voluntary nature of participa-
tion was stressed and the rank of the military originator
of the email was removed to avoid any perception of
coercion.
20 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the
UK March – August 2015 by a single investigator (HD),
using a topic guide with open-ended questions from
which the interviewee and interviewer were free to de-
part. The interviews were structured to cover three areas
of experience: perceptions from the point of receiving
deployment orders to the end of pre-deployment
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training; perceptions whilst on deployment, including
the identification of common or especially troubling eth-
ical challenges; and, finally participants’ reflections on
their experience subsequent to their return. The inter-
views were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.
The interviews were coded independently by Jenkins
(SJ) and HD. When both had completed coding nine in-
terviews, they met to discuss the emerging codes and to
compare coding on a single transcript, as a way of bol-
stering intercoder reliability [9]. A preliminary coding
scheme was then developed. The coded transcriptions
were checked against this and then the outstanding tran-
scriptions were coded. A further meeting was held to
discuss and agree the final coding scheme. This resulted
in single data set, managed using NVivo software ‘to fa-
cilitate an accurate and transparent data analysis
process’, [10] with adjustments being made to the coding
following discussion. After further discussion, the codes
were grouped into categories that best reflected the pat-
terns emerging from the data, and key overarching con-
cepts were selected. These were then discussed with the
project advisory group. The advisory group comprised
one independent, senior academic specialist in disaster
bioethics and also knowledgeable about the research
methods used (Professor Lisa Schwartz, McMaster Uni-
versity, Canada), the then Medical Director of RCDM
(Brigadier Timothy Hodgetts) and an experienced De-
ployed Medical Director (Colonel Jeremy Hemmings)
who chaired the meetings.
This thematic analysis mapped many of the stages of
the process described by Braun and Clarke [11]. Given
the dearth of literature on these ethical issues, we took a
largely conventional approach to content analysis [11]
using the data to draw conclusions about themes in the
participants’ thinking but not trying to construct a uni-
fied overarching theory to explain these as per a
grounded theory approach [12]. The results were pre-
sented to selective participants for member validation.
Results
The numbers of participants, reported by role-
group and period of deployment, and interview length,
are shown in Table 1. Face to face interviews tended to
be longer than telephone interviews, though the shortest
interview was one conducted face-to-face.
From this rich data set, this paper reports on the broader
ethical challenges that the participants experienced. Our
findings are illustrated with selected quotations that reflect
typical responses and the range of participants within each
of the three broad groups. To protect participants’ identity,
given the relatively small population size, we have not in-
cluded rank or role using instead a simple numbering sys-
tem (P1, P2 etc.). To avoid repetition, asterisks (* ** *** etc.)
are used to identify particular quotations and participants
that are referred to again later.
Attitudes to and motivations for deploying
Many participants regarded themselves as having volun-
teered for deployment. Indeed, some participants re-
ported making strenuous efforts to go. This may have
been a misperception given that, as one participant ex-
plained: "It’s not done as ‘Are you willing to go because if
you are not you don’t have to’ ...[it’s] only used in order
to prioritise people...so the idea of volunteering...it’s a bit
of a misnomer." (P17) Nonetheless, for these partici-
pants, the decision to volunteer was an ethical one. The
majority felt compelled to respond to the unfolding hu-
manitarian crisis and human suffering it was generating.
Some cited having the skills/ability to make a difference
as a motivation and one participant reported feeling a
personal affiliation with the African people.
...it was very clear that there was a, a desperate
humanitarian crisis going on and so there was a
desperate need. (P12).
I was watching this suffering on the TV… I’d watched
the TV and think, ‘I'm a nurse, an experienced nurse,’
and I, I, I sort of knew in my heart. I ... really wanted
to do something. I knew I had the skills, as it were, to
alleviate suffering. (P7).
A significant minority sought to deploy primarily as a
career opportunity, sometimes related to their medical
speciality or command/rank ambitions, or they simply
welcomed the opportunity to deploy.
Table 1 Participant characteristics and interview length
Deployed role Doctors Nursing Other
Total 20 7 6 7
Deployed Oct-Dec 2014 Dec- Mar 2015 April–July 2015 n/a
7 11 1 1
Interviews Shortest Longest Mean 45–75 min Face-to-face
31 mins 208 mins 80 mins 10 11
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I was immediately interested ... but only in a role that
is relevant to my rank, because what I didn’t want to
be doing was taking time out from work or from my
reservist role if I felt that it was ... a role that wasn’t
also going to career develop me and professionally
develop me... I was desperately keen to go but I wanted
to make it the best opportunity possible ... and which
will then translate to skills that I bring back into my
workplace. (P12).
Rarely did participants provide a single motivation and
most cited a combination of the above reasons (as P12
above). Of those who did not report actively seeking to
deploy, most reported feeling sanguine about the pro-
spect, regarding deployment as part of military life;
others were part of a high readiness unit and were there-
fore already on notice to deploy. A small minority re-
ported being very negative about the prospect, feeling
that this type of mission was not what they signed up
for when they joined the military.
I wasn’t given the order to go, but I am in the military
and that’s what’s expected of me. (P11).
...as a military or army medic we all joined up to
maintain the fighting strength of the British Army and
this just wasn’t anything to do with that. (P5*).
This view is in contrast to those who reported joining
the military to do humanitarian work and/or being dis-
appointed by how few opportunities had arisen to do so.
I thought I was joining up to travel round the world
and to save people...I’ve done nearly eighteen years
now and this is the first humanitarian work I’ve
done...when I was joining up I thought we would be
doing a lot more disaster relief kind of work. (P19).
Only a very few participants made no reference to
concerns about the personal risks involved, most
expressed at least initial concerns. All of the participants
expressed confidence in the PPE training they had re-
ceived and found this reassuring. Some referred expli-
citly to having trust in the military to look after them,
and one reservist reported that whilst they had volun-
teered to deploy with the military they would not have
gone as a National Health Service (NHS) volunteer.
Sheer terror because I thought it was operation certain
death. (P5).
...it would always be one of those things that would
happen – which would be human error rather than
actually anything you hadn’t done yourself to
prevent...we were taught very much to be very
sensible...not to take any risks and to practice our
drills...But there are obviously occasions that are
completely out of your hands, when dealing with
patients that are confused or agitated... (P21).
I wasn’t really worried about catching Ebola because I
did have a lot of trust in training we had and I felt
confident that as long as I stuck to my ‘drills and
skills’ and we looked after each other, we’d be fine.
(P13***).
Perceptions of ‘the mission’ and concerns for personal
safety
The participants provided a uniform account of the
mission, namely that they were deploying to provide
high quality care to EVD-infected healthcare workers
so as to bolster confidence internationally (other
countries would send medical teams to help) and lo-
cally (healthcare professionals would continue working
knowing they would get treated if they became in-
fected); some also made reference to containing the
spread of EVD.
Well all the civilian healthcare people out there, they
are basically like ‘If the army aren’t there, then we’re
not going to be here’. So if the army aren’t there then
the healthcare professionals won’t be there, so then no
one will get treated...and then it’s just going to be...a
massive pandemic of Ebola...it’s just going to go global.
(P16).
Their perception of the mission, however, varied. Some
participants believed that they were embarked on a fun-
damentally humanitarian mission whilst others regarded
it as a non-combat contingency mission. Participants
often suggested that that there was an overriding desire
from the top of the chain of command to minimise the
risk that personnel would be infected.
Whereas the army certainly has not done a
humanitarian mission like this before I don’t think
and has not done much in the way of humanitarian,
medical humanitarian stuff for a long time. (P1).
...it was more interesting because it was something so
different and we hadn’t done a contingency op before
so that made it a bit more interesting but generally
not more important I don’t think than previous
deployments. (P15).
...people senior to us were terrified of military
personnel contracting Ebola or dying out in Africa or
over-stretching resources back in the UK. (P5).
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Participants’ understanding of the nature of the mis-
sion, however, affected their views on how minimal risk
should be conceived. Successfully delivering the mission
and minimising risk was experienced as a significant eth-
ical challenge. The participants’ perceptions about risk
helped to inform our understanding of why this was, as
we shall now explain.
No participants seemed inherently risk-adverse, and
several stated explicitly that risk-taking is part and parcel
of what the military do.
...if you join the Army you are expecting to get sent
into risky places and the, the whole purpose of the
Army is so that we can take that risk and so that the
UK can remain safe. I mean that’s the whole point
about having an army at all is, is for the promotion of
the safety of home. So, I personally don’t think that
anyone who was deploying should have felt that their
safety was above that of... the population back at
home. (P17**).
Equally, a minority felt that they had not ‘signed up
for’ these particular risks, suggesting that risk-perception
was related closely to their understanding of the justifi-
cation for risk-taking (see P5* above). Some thought that
the risk from EVD was a different sort of risk to that
normally taken without necessarily suggesting that it
was therefore a greater risk. Reference was made to in-
fection being a risk that could not be seen, unlike nor-
mal combat risks.
Ebola is an unseen killer. You can’t see it and of
course what we’re used to in a trauma-type environ-
ment is, is things which are very visible. So the fact
that it is...it is invisible it’s scary. You know there’s no,
there’s no doubt about it, it’s scary. (P12).
This observation was probed in later interviews be-
cause it was not obvious that normal military risks
are clearly visible; snipers, landmines and improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), for instance, are most ef-
fective when their position has not been detected.
Moreover, larger medical units are generally located
at a relatively safe distance from combat operations.
Accordingly, it seemed to us that combat duties may
also entail an element of ever-present but unseen
danger. Probing brought some clarity to the con-
cerns being expressed. The sense that the risk was
invisible was heightened because one might be in-
fected for several days before realising it. Bullets and
explosives leave obvious injuries that can then be
responded to; the gravity or otherwise of these is
more immediately clear, and the treatment pathways
more familiar.
one of the guys said, that he thought it was much
worse than being on patrol; not because it was
actually more dangerous but that if he was on patrol
and he stepped on a landmine, he knew about it,
whereas, if he caught Ebola, he wouldn’t know about it
till the week later, which was – which a lot of us found
a very disturbing concept, once we started thinking
about that... it’s almost better to be harmed in a way
that you’re aware of immediately than to have
something in your body that’s harming you and you
don’t know, you’re either harmed or you’re not harmed
... when you’re on the ground. ... we had exposures to
Ebola, there were a lot of people who found that very
difficult; the idea of, ‘I might actually have caught this
yesterday and I just don’t know it yet’ ...a lot of people
said they found that very uncomfortable; the not
knowing if they’d already made the mistake. (P18).
Some participants who regarded the mission as pri-
marily a humanitarian one felt the scale of the outbreak
justified a higher risk threshold. Other participants also
felt that the risk-aversion governing the mission ran
counter to the general willingness to expose military
personnel to risk in combat operations.
Our mission wasn’t to go there and not get infected,
our mission was to go there and have a safe ETU
[Ebola treatment unit] to treat healthcare workers and
we’ve done that and if the mission is important enough
to have to acknowledge some risk there and people
think, if they think you can eliminate risk in looking
after people with Ebola down there, it’s impossible and
you can’t and you will always have a human factor or
a human error as how someone will get infected and
that’s a disaster but if you believe in the overall
mission, which I do, then I think it’s justified. (P2).
We are always quoted a figure of risk when we deploy.
But you know people have deployed for the last ten
years, into areas where they are risking their lives, and
we are medics, we are doctors. What’s the difference?
We are all in the same organisation and it’s a risk.
(P21).
Some staff with specialist knowledge in infectious dis-
ease or managing contamination thought the risks of be-
coming infected whilst wearing PPE were over-stated. As
we have already noted, generally staff felt confident that
they were fairly safe if they followed their training.
I must admit I wasn’t as nervous about this
deployment because I think I’d managed to put the
disease into perspective before I’d even got there and
sort of said statistically it’s actually quite low risk so
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long as you are sensible in those key moments when
you might be dealing with a patient. (P10).
Several mentioned the ‘body-mapping’2 exercise [13]
during training and had found this very reassuring. Partic-
ipants who deployed during the period when, in rapid suc-
cession, one colleague was confirmed to be EVD positive
and two others experienced needlestick injuries, felt that
concerns about risk had been heightened as a result.
I think that people were just wary about going into the
facility then [after the needle sticks and infection] they
didn’t really think...I think people were just a bit
scared then. (P16).
All participants thought that their own safety should
be a priority, and many found it reassuring that the mis-
sion was conducted according to this principle. Views
differed, however, on how this should be operationalised.
Some cited a target of 0% or 1% infection for mission
success, which they understood had been politically mo-
tivated. Those who cited this figure tended to think it
was meaningless or unrealistic. Those who were respon-
sible for the safety of others (team leaders, for instance)
reported operationalising their own judgements about
what was risky. Some participants felt that acceptable
risk was a subjective matter that was down to each indi-
vidual to decide at the time.
...my priority was keeping my people safe...I would not
send my people into the facility unless there was a
good reason for them to go. (P14).
I think that people, even in a military system, people
do need to be able to opt out of a scenario where there
is a 1 % risk of getting infected with a life-threatening
disease...ultimately if someone doesn’t want to be
there...they will find a way to go sick or they won’t do
their job very well so I would rather not have someone
there who did not want to be there. (P3).
Some, however, reported having had to deal with col-
leagues who they thought were unduly risk averse.
I would have described [colleague] as making some
fairly risk-averse – surprisingly risk-averse decisions in
some cases and then not in others. (P17).
One also reported the need to rein in those who
regarded undertaking invasive procedures in the red
zone as a “badge of honour” (P18).
The management of risk was widely regarded as re-
quiring compromises to be made in how patients were
cared for and in particular how they were nursed.
...our priority was staff health and patient health and
safety but there was an element of risk aversion that
made it difficult for the practitioners to feel that they
were contributing fully and I can understand why that
was because Ebola is a killer so you don’t want people
to have too much freedom (P9).
The participants reported that risk management pre-
sented a significant ethical challenge, and the need to
balance risk to self with patient care is reflected in some
of the specific ethical issues that participants discussed
(Table 2).
Reactions to ‘empty beds’
The most commonly reported ethical challenge was
whether the unit should have treated more patients.
Table 2 Perceived ethical challenges reported
• ‘Volunteering’ for deployment
• Number of patients being treated/empty beds
• Kinds of patients being treated – who should be regarded as a
healthcare worker
• Specific types of care for the patient where balancing risks to self
against providing care were especially acute. Examples included:
Use of the bowel management system
Treatment of agitated patients
Time spent in the red zone
Comforting dying patients
• End of life care and decisions
• Managing and responding to differences in risk perception, between
staff, over time and in response to critical incidents
• Discharging of vulnerable patients
• Request to give convalescent blood
• Use of [the only] ventilator in the ‘red zone’
• Separation of infected healthcare professionals from their infected
• children (this treatment unit did not admit children)
• Management and disposal of bodies
• Use of cameras to monitor patients/staff
• Maintaining staff morale
• Evacuation decisions and differences in the kinds of patients who
were evacuated
• Using novel equipment
• Transporting stage 3 patients over great distances
• Uncertainty how best to treat patients (because optimal treatment
for EVD unclear)
• ‘Decompression’ on return
• Implementing decisions from above, the rationale for which was not
clear
• Sharing of resources and facilities with NGOs
• Not being able to use/keep up skills whilst on deployment
• Persuading patients not take their own discharge
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Our participants reported that the treatment unit was
consistently running under capacity: "the facility was never
full, it never got beyond 50% capacity and yet there were
clear groups of people it wouldn’t take". (P10). Many
regarded this as a significant ethical challenge because the
facilities, expertise and resources were standing idle in a sea
of need.
There we were sat in the best treatment facility in the
whole of Africa, fantastic equipment and
staff...products that were expiring each week and
getting thrown away...sat there in a facility that I think
only had about four patients in it at the time... a
complete catastrophe going on all around us ...and
people really struggled with that. (P3).
The biggest challenge was the justice
component...because we had so much we could offer
but we were treating hardly any patients and that
didn’t sit very well with any of us because working in a
place where there is lots and lots of suffering and
disease and death and things and knowing that we
could help but we’re not allowed to, that was awful.
(P5).
A minority disagreed with efforts to increase the num-
ber of patients admitted.
Some of the staff got a bit anti for that because ‘Hang
on a minute, why are we putting ourselves at risk you
go and look after someone who’s not even on our
profile list?’. (P6).
One participant took the view that although the re-
sources deployed seemed excessive given the number of
patients treated, they may not have been disproportion-
ate to the resources used to care for Ebola patients back
in the UK. This realisation enabled the participant to
take pride in what was achieved.
...deep down as a doctor you always want...to see as
many patients as possible, and help as many patients as
possible, and treat as many patients as possible. I didn’t
really have that choice because I was deploying on a
military operation...The Royal Free is an example of –
some of the physicians at the Royal Free were dealing
with tiny numbers of [Ebola] patients, with huge
numbers of healthcare workers involved in the care of
one patient. [If you take this on board] then you don’t
feel guilty but feel proud of the work that you’ve
actually managed to do in your specific role. (P21).
Most participants were able to articulate some version
of both sides of the argument, but participants in favour
of greater bed occupancy tended to be those who
regarded themselves to be on a humanitarian mission.
Views also reflected perceptions of risk outlined above.
Strong feelings may have been exacerbated by the fact
that the opposite problem had been anticipated, namely
that the unit would be overwhelmed.
...we kind of expected to be a bit more overwhelmed
with patients, we would have perhaps to be choosing
between who we had beds for and who we didn’t have
beds for similar to a lot of other operations where you
have your eligibility criteria (P15).
The medical staff in particular tended to think that the
integrity and spirit of the mission would have been pre-
served by loosening the MRoE or making greater use of
the commanding officer’s discretion to accept patients
outside the MRoE: "…maybe they weren’t briefed about
how restrictive the medical rules of eligibility were ... even
if we were asking for patients of Ebola, we couldn’t get
them in because [of the MRoE]" (P19). Many partici-
pants were conscious that staff safety would be better
preserved running at a consistent capacity since this
avoided skill fade.
...for maintaining safety of the staff it is better to have
a continual level of work than it is to surge up and
down with small numbers of cases...(P2).
The feeling of being under-utilized, which was fre-
quently associated with the MRoE, often prompted par-
ticipants to comment that Operation GRITROCK was
highly politicised. Many participants expressed a belief
that decisions about matters of detail, including in rela-
tion to medical management, were being taken at a very
high (some thought ministerial and even prime minister-
ial) level.
...it was a very political deployment....in the sense that
there was an awful lot of scrutiny from on high...we
were having regular briefings from Cobra [Cabinet
Office briefing room A3]...there was an awful lot of
scrutiny from Number 10 [Downing Street], it was the
run up to the election... (P10).
This was experienced as unprecedented and unwel-
come interference particularly for clinicians used to ex-
ercising clinical judgement fairly autonomously. It is
possible that this was the result of our participants’ per-
ception that Operation GRITROCK was essentially a
medical operation whereas military healthcare personnel
normally deploy to support combat missions, meaning
that clinicians are more insulated from higher-level pol-
itical preoccupations. Whatever the cause, the effect was
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that some participants in all groups were left with the
impression that those on the ground were unable to take
responsibility for, or justify, the decisions being made,
leaving them to implement decisions that, as far as they
were concerned, did not make sense in the context of
their understanding of the mission. This was also a
source of perceived ethical tension.
I mean we are in the armed forces, it is not a
democracy you know. If someone just is honest and
says: ‘no this decision has been made end of, just put
up with it’, then although we might not be happy with
it, we will put up with it because we know that’s the
organisation. But to obfuscate because someone had
made a decision that people may be ethically unhappy
with but they are not willing to say, ‘yes, I have made
that decision and I am going to stand by it’, is something
that was very frustrating, we didn’t know at what stage
those decisions were really being made or enforced. (P4).
Points of reference for participants’ values
A shared understanding of what was meant by an ethical
challenge was established either during the interview or
immediately before it commenced. We took as our
working definition that adopted by Schwartz et al.: ‘situ-
ations where either the HCPs [health care professionals]
knew what they felt was the right thing to do but were
somehow prevented from enacting it, or where “doing
the right thing” also caused harm’ [4].
Their values and norms manifested themselves in ei-
ther how participants perceived ethical challenges to
have arisen – where they felt unable to act in accordance
with their values – or in how they perceived and ad-
dressed the specific ethical challenges (see Table 2
above) they faced. Only a few participants used terms
(the technical language of ethics) that spoke directly to
specific ethical principles or values.
Our participants’ understanding of what ‘the right
thing’ was tended to be informed by values and norms
derived from a combination of:
i. Previous deployment experience
For most (but not all) participants this was combat ex-
perience. Previous deployment experience was influential
in shaping expectations and norms with regard to the ap-
plication of MRoE and risk perception (see previous sec-
tion on risk) but was also referred to in relation to specific
issues such as the dignified handling of human remains.
I have worked in resource limited settings before and
certainly in Afghanistan… we had at least two
patients who would have been dialysed if they’d been
in the UK and who died because we did not have any
dialysis available. So I am used … to dealing with that
and the concept that you can’t give people care that
you don’t have available. (P1).
Previously on tours in Afghanistan that I’d done, the
bodies were handled with a lot of dignity afterwards.
(P22).
The bodies of those who die from EVD are highly con-
tagious. This meant that the usual rituals around death
(both for staff and in terms of the local culture) could
not be observed. The loss of these rituals added to the
discomfort of staff.
Deviations from previous experience created uncer-
tainties that, where unresolved, generated what our par-
ticipants perceived as ethical challenges.
I am not naive enough to think that at an operational
level you truly understanding the wider picture but if
you are...on the front line implementing the decisions
that are made higher up...I did enforce them [MRoE]
the year before when I was in ... Afghanistan...and that
was a very difficult decision to make...but I never had
so many struggles with what I felt was unethical. (P2).
ii. NHS/UK experience
Similarities with familiar practices were a source of re-
assurance and dissimilarities prompted reflection if not
discomfort.
Because deep down inside you know that you should
be, you know, there’s this patient does he need a bowel
management system? Well actually no he wouldn’t do
if he was back in the UK because you wouldn’t do it
because it benefits us ‘cause we have to go in and
change him all the time. (P13).
There was an understanding that we’d prioritise the
military side first but...I see a child of say seven years
old from the Save the Children side, in my mind, I
prioritise, just like the NHS, I prioritise the child. (P19).
Another example was the rationale P21 recalled above
that “the Royal Free were dealing with tiny numbers of
[Ebola] patients, with huge numbers of healthcare workers
involved in the care of one patient.” This perceived similar-
ity with the situation in the treatment unit enabled that
participant to feel pride in what was achieved.
iii. Professional values
Professional values were a clear source of guidance as
one might expect but also create the ‘dual obligation’
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problem. This participant, for instance, thought that ad-
herence to professional values was more important than
following orders, and indeed may be a measure of the le-
gality of orders.
You’ve kind of got two sets of rules for want of a better
word that you kind of have to abide by...I have my
Code of Conduct, the NMC [Nursing and Midwifery
Council] Code of Conduct. I would like to think that if
I was asked to do anything militarily that came into
conflict with that NMC code I would be able to stand
up and say ‘No’ and that you could then put that down
to erm an unlawful order that’s been given you. (P11).
iv. Military values
Unsurprisingly, our data suggest that our participants
were highly conscious of being military personnel. Refer-
ences to values, including military values, were often not
explicitly expressed or identified but can be inferred from
the sentiments being expressed by the participants. A
summary of UK military values can be found in Table 3.
Some participants expressed trust in, or at least ac-
ceptance of, the chain of command, although for others
Operation GRITROCK undermined this trust. A sense
of obligation within the chain of command resulted in
paternalistic benevolence to those under one’s com-
mand, such as bolstering troop morale and serving their
interests (and this may at least partly account for the
trust in the chain of command).
As their boss, it’s my job to look after them and keep
them safe...in my previous roles, I’ve always taken my
responsibility to looking after my soldiers very
seriously...I will always refer to my personnel as
soldiers; I think of myself as a soldier...It does make me
fiercely protective of my soldiers...where the risk and
the danger was so real...it directly affected us it just
makes my fiercely protective of my people. (P14).
Participants generally demonstrated a willing, but not
blind, adherence to ‘the mission’. As we have seen in re-
lation to motivation and risk perception the nature of
the mission was itself a yardstick against which to meas-
ure the right response to situations. Some participants,
like P17** above (‘we can take that risk and so that the
UK can remain safe’), clearly expressed the view that be-
ing in the military meant being in service to, and taking
risks on behalf of, the nation. As we have seen already,
again in relation to risk, (for instance, P13*** above: “I
felt confident that as long as I stuck to my ‘drills and
skills’ and we looked after each other, we’d be fine”) there
was also a strong identification with a team or unit. In
this respect, the ‘self ’ was regarded as part of, important
to, and protected by the collective or team.
you can’t do rushing in... you can’t do anything more
than you can do. You take it slowly because...accidents
to our own staff then compromise even more people
because then you’ve got a situation where you’ve gotta
send another team in to get them out. (P12).
Although many regarded the mission as humanitarian,
participants did not refer specifically to the humanitarian
codes of conduct such as those advocated by Sphere [18]
or the International Committee of the Red Cross [19,
20]; though the United Nations Office for the Coordin-
ation of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) humanitarian
principles [21] are listed in relevant doctrine (the 3rd
edition, most current edition of which was published
December 2016 but the principles are also listed in the
2nd edition published 2012) [22]. These do, however,
have much in common with e.g. professional values.
One participant seemed, however, to have some familiar-
ity with the humanitarian principles and had come to
question whether the military should have a role in hu-
manitarian missions as a result.
When we do a purely military operation, you know, I
believe our role is to look after our service men, as
military doctors to look after them...someone said to
me recently ‘well couldn’t we shape the military to be
more of a humanitarian response?’ and after
GRITROCK I think we shouldn’t; I don’t think we have
much of a role to play in humanitarian response
because of the lack of adhering to kind of basic
humanitarian principles – independence, humanity
etc... (P2).
Table 3 UK military values
The three services that comprise the UK military, The Royal Air Force,
the Royal Navy and the Army, articulate their own values and ethos. In
summary, they are as follows:
Royal Air Force’s ‘Core values and standards’ [14] are:
Respect – Mutual and Self Respect
Integrity – Moral Courage – Honesty – Responsibility – Justice
Service – Physical Courage – Loyalty – Commitment – Teamwork
Excellence – Personal Excellence – Discipline – Pride
Royal Navy’s ‘Core Values’ [15] are: commitment, courage, discipline,
respect for others, integrity, loyalty
The Army’s ‘Values and Standards’ [16] are: loyalty, integrity, courage,
discipline, respect for others and selfless commitment
The Royal Marines (part of the Royal Navy) has its own distinctive ethos
and values. [17] The Royal Marines ethos is made up of the individual
‘Commando Spirit’ (courage, determination, unselfishness, and
cheerfulness in the face of adversity) and the collective ‘Group Values’ of
courage, unity, determination, adaptability, unselfishness, humility,
cheerfulness, professional standards, fortitude and commando humour.
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Discussion
Perceptions about volunteering were prevalent in both
reservists and regulars, even though it is only reservists
who have any, albeit limited, control over the timing of
their mobilisation [23]. It is possible that the sense of be-
ing a volunteer arose because traditional high readiness
units are trauma-centred and different skills are needed
to tackle an infectious disease outbreak. Accordingly,
many of those who initially deployed with the high
readiness unit were infectious diseases/infection control
specialists or others perceived to have skills in relation
to general nursing, palliation or achieving difficult ven-
ous access, and who were not ‘scheduled’ to deploy or
part of the high readiness unit at the time. Many of our
participants actively sought or welcomed deployment
but it is not obvious how much weight would have been
given to reluctance had it been expressed and if no re-
placement was available. Nonetheless, our data suggests
that the moral motivations expressed by our partici-
pants, which align more with NGO workers than has
sometimes been suggested, [24] should be acknowl-
edged. Given that some humanitarian disasters are a dir-
ect result of armed conflict, the strong pull felt by some
of our participants to undertake humanitarian work may
seem at odds with the decision to join the military. This
may be the result of historical recruitment campaigns
that appeared to emphasise humanitarian action, [25]
even though – in the experience of our participants, at
least – it has not been a core activity in recent years.
This sense of volunteering is further testament to the
sense of duty felt by some healthcare workers to provide
care despite the personal risks of doing so. Trust in mili-
tary training (‘drills and skills’), colleagues and military
infrastructures and the PPE provided was a significant
factor in addressing concerns about risk. There may be
lessons here for civilian health services preparing for
domestic emergencies, including pandemics and
bioterrorism.
The discomfort reported in relation to the application
of the MRoE was not surprising. It is a typical manifest-
ation of the dual obligation problem: healthcare profes-
sional or soldier first? Across the data set, our
participants provided no consistent response to this
question. Some clearly identified more with their mili-
tary obligations and others with their professional obli-
gations. This may in part be explained by the fact that
some participants had moved from conventional military
combat roles into more healthcare focussed roles, for
which they undertook conventional professional training
and gained professional qualifications. Others gained
their professional qualifications before joining the mili-
tary, and others qualified alongside maintaining a reserv-
ist role. Some participants seemed reconciled to the
tension in their different roles. This is consistent with
Gordon’s findings that military doctors forge an identity
by finding ways of bridging the two alternative sets of
obligations [26].
Dual obligations form only part of the problem. The
UK medical military exists to support the military popu-
lation at risk, but must also operate according to United
Nations (UN) agreements. Of particular relevance in the
case of Operation GRITROCK are the UNOCHA guide-
lines [27] and the ‘Oslo guidelines’, [28] which require
humanitarian activities to be sensitive to an indigenous
government’s own efforts to maintain infrastructures.
This principle applies equally to civilian responders. Ac-
cess to UK medical military facilities are always governed
by MRoE, which ensure facilities operate without under-
mining the ‘military mission’, international agreements
or codes of professional conduct. This is a difficult bal-
ance, compounded for military healthcare personnel by
their professional imperative to offer treatment to
those in need. It is one that invariably produces con-
troversy, [29] and Operation GRITROCK was no ex-
ception [30, 31]. The ethical disquiet for military
healthcare personnel is particularly acute when they
have spare capacity and resources. The MRoE may
deny help to those who need it and create ‘dual stan-
dards of care’ (military facilities, for instance, may be
superior - in terms of specialised and experienced
staff and resources - to local facilities) [29, 32]. Mili-
tary medical personnel, as indicated in our data, are
accustomed to circumstances where capacity in com-
bat missions needs to be kept in reserve for a poten-
tial influx of wounded personnel. In this deployment,
the corollary population were eligible patients, par-
ticularly international healthcare and other staff,
thereby making good on the undertaking to provide a
safety net for expatriates helping the local population.
Given that the participants understood the mission
and did not appear to reject the whole notion of
MRoE, it is worth reflecting a little further on the
discomfort expressed in this context.
There was a great deal of UK media coverage of the
scale of the Ebola threat, and the human suffering being
left in its wake. Our participants, like people the world
over, had been following the unfolding crisis. The de-
ployment of UK troops also received considerable atten-
tion. The proportion of local healthcare workers affected
by EVD had, however, peaked over the summer of 2014
[33]. The treatment unit admitted 125 patients from its
opening in November 2014 to June 2015: of these 43
were confirmed to have EVD and only one confirmed
EVD patient was treated in the unit after 1st April 2015
[34]. A highly motivated and primed workforce believing
itself to be on a humanitarian mission therefore found
itself under-utilised, but conscious that it occupied an
extremely well-resourced facility running alongside a
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local system that was still over-stretched. This greatly ex-
acerbated the usual tensions over MRoE. Some partici-
pants felt that once the peak had passed, the superior
facilities they were able to offer should have been made
available to anyone infected with EVD in Sierra Leone so
as to improve their prospects of survival and comfort.
Such an extension to the mission at this point may, how-
ever, have breached the Oslo guidelines (for instance, by
potentially undermining local services). This tension was
not a uniquely military/medical one. An NGO-run, simi-
larly situated unit would face the same dilemma at this
point in an epidemic. Indeed, NGO healthcare workers’
practice may also be additionally constrained, not by mili-
tary imperatives but by donor expectations and tightly de-
fined/negotiated missions [35, 36]. Arguably, constraints
on practice such as these are further common ethical
ground between NGO and military responders.
Although some of our participants reported feeling very
conflicted as a result of not being able to do more when they
had the capacity and resources to do so, it is worth noting
that the international decision to deploy troops to West
Africa may well have bolstered the confidence and resolve
of civilian responders, [37] which was the rationale behind
establishing the treatment unit [3] and the MRoE under
which it accepted patients. Nonetheless, the feelings of dis-
tress, anger and impotence created by the empty beds had
clearly remained with our participants several months later.
In terms of military training and preparation, lessons
can be learned from the difference in perception of the
ethical challenges experienced that resulted from the dif-
ferences in perception about the essential nature of the
mission (humanitarian/military), by exploring and cri-
tiquing the likely sources of ethical values (military, pro-
fessional and based on deployed and non-deployed
experiences) and the potential for ethical distress where
the reasons for decisions are not fully explained/shared.
Discussing likely scenarios and potential resolutions and
their relative advantages and disadvantages is an established
way of preparing healthcare workers to meet the ethical
challenges they may face in their workplace. The experi-
ences of our participants were a rich source of data for such
scenarios, which could be generalised beyond the military
context and also generalised to other serious infectious dis-
ease outbreaks. Such scenarios could be incorporated into
the training and preparation of future healthcare profes-
sionals and other health-related staff (military and civilian)
for the ethical challenges that they may face on humanitar-
ian deployment. A series of fictionalised case studies were
therefore created, based on composite experiences of our
participants. These scenarios (along with some notes to aid
e.g. group discussion or self-directed learning) can be found
on the project website: https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
med/research/hscience/sssh/newethics/bioethics/milmed/
ebola/caseteaching/.
Limitations
It is important to recognise that these findings are based
on a qualitative study that explored the subjective views
and perceptions of those who participated. It was not an
investigation or inquiry aimed at determining specific
facts about the military deployment. It offers an insight
into how those who participated reportedly felt about
their experiences. The nature and purpose of the study
was advertised in the information sheets and there may
therefore be some degree of volunteer bias in the re-
sponses. We do, however, feel fairly confident that satur-
ation in this group was achieved. The semi-structured
nature of the interview guide may have had a ‘framing’
effect.
Conclusion
This study offers unique insights into the military
healthcare workers’ experiences of humanitarian deploy-
ment, and these experiences were gained in the unprece-
dented context of the first major Ebola outbreak. Those
interviewed expected the treatment unit to be over-
whelmed and the empty beds presented a significant and
pervasive ethical challenge for them, particularly for
those professing humanitarian motivations. The different
perceptions of the mission (humanitarian/military) gave
rise to different perceptions of the ethical challenges be-
ing faced. Participants’ judgements were also influenced
by values from four principal sources, including specific
military values that might not be shared by civilian hu-
manitarians. Many participants, however, expressed mo-
tivations that gave them common purpose with NGO
volunteers.
We are currently exploring with the military (and civil-
ian organisations) how to best to ensure that the lessons
identified in this exercise are incorporated into policy
and practice going forward.
Endnotes
1Medical Rules of Eligibility (MoRE) are the rules gov-
erning who will be given access to UK military facilities,
taking current capacity and existing and upcoming com-
bat operations into account. UK and allied troops gener-
ally have access to all facilities, as may non-local
nationals from allied nations. Local nationals may be
treated under some circumstances and according to cap-
acity. For more information on UK MRoE see Minis-
try of Defence (Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre) Joint Doctrine Note 3/14 The Military Med-
ical Contribution to Security and Stabilisation. Crown
Copyright June 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324637/
20140616-JDN_3_14_Med_contr_DCDC.pdf [Accessed
26th June 2017]
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2Simulation training prior to deployment included a
replica of the treatment unit and simulated care, treat-
ment and investigations of ‘patients’ complete with sim-
ulated bodily fluids. The bodily fluids included titrated
amounts of ultraviolet dye. The dye represented the
virus found in the bodily fluids of infected patients and
the titration simulated different levels of infectiousness.
Prior to and after removal of their PPE, trainees were
scanned using a hand-held ultraviolet lamp. This re-
vealed any traces of the ultraviolet dye signifying areas of
potential contamination, which were formally mapped
before and after doffing PPE. Thus the extent to which
the PPE had contained the simulated contamination was
immediately apparent, as well as providing potential
quality assurance and the ability to improve on doffing
and decontamination techniques where any breach was
noted.
3Cobra stands for ‘Cabinet Office briefing room A’. It
part of the UK governments’ civil contingency planning
and coordinates the emergency response across govern-
ment departments. The composition of the group varies
according to the emergency. Cobra is often but not al-
ways chaired by the Prime Minister.
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